Ext User(Bonzo)
05-06-2007, 03:43 PM
Witness alarmist Carl Sagan (Aided by that old kook Ehrlich)
and his crazy predictions
EXTRACT FROM A MICHAEL CRICHTON SPEECH
In 1975, the National Academy of Sciences reported on "Long-Term
Worldwide Effects of Multiple Nuclear Weapons Detonations" but the
report estimated the effect of dust from nuclear blasts to be relatively
minor. In 1979, the Office of Technology Assessment issued a report on
"The Effects of Nuclear War" and stated that nuclear war could perhaps
produce irreversible adverse consequences on the environment. However,
because the scientific processes involved were poorly understood, the
report stated it was not possible to estimate the probable magnitude of
such damage.
Three years later, in 1982, the Swedish Academy of Sciences commissioned
a report entitled "The Atmosphere after a Nuclear War: Twilight at
Noon," which attempted to quantify the effect of smoke from burning
forests and cities. The authors speculated that there would be so much
smoke that a large cloud over the northern hemisphere would reduce
incoming sunlight below the level required for photosynthesis, and that
this would last for weeks or even longer.
The following year, five scientists including Richard Turco and Carl
Sagan published a paper in Science called "Nuclear Winter: Global
Consequences of Multiple Nuclear Explosions." This was the so-called
TTAPS report, which attempted to quantify more rigorously the
atmospheric effects, with the added credibility to be gained from an
actual computer model of climate.
At the heart of the TTAPS undertaking was another equation, never
specifically expressed, but one that could be paraphrased as follows:
Ds = Wn Ws Wh Tf Tb Pt Pr Pe. etc
(The amount of tropospheric dust=# warheads x size warheads x warhead
detonation height x flammability of targets x Target burn duration x
Particles entering the Troposphere x Particle reflectivity x Particle
endurance.and so on.)
The similarity to the Drake equation is striking. As with the Drake
equation, none of the variables can be determined. None at all. The
TTAPS study addressed this problem in part by mapping out different
wartime scenarios and assigning numbers to some of the variables, but
even so, the remaining variables were-and are-simply unknowable. Nobody
knows how much smoke will be generated when cities burn, creating
particles of what kind, and for how long. No one knows the effect of
local weather conditions on the amount of particles that will be
injected into the troposphere. No one knows how long the particles will
remain in the troposphere. And so on.
And remember, this is only four years after the OTA study concluded that
the underlying scientific processes were so poorly known that no
estimates could be reliably made. Nevertheless, the TTAPS study not only
made those estimates, but concluded they were catastrophic.
According to Sagan and his co-workers, even a limited 5,000 megaton
nuclear exchange would cause a global temperature drop of more than 35
degrees Centigrade, and this change would last for three months. The
greatest volcanic eruptions that we know of changed world temperatures
somewhere between .5 and 2 degrees Centigrade. Ice ages changed global
temperatures by 10 degrees. Here we have an estimated change three times
greater than any ice age. One might expect it to be the subject of some
dispute.
But Sagan and his co-workers were prepared, for nuclear winter was from
the outset the subject of a well-orchestrated media campaign. The first
announcement of nuclear winter appeared in an article by Sagan in the
Sunday supplement, Parade. The very next day, a highly-publicized,
high-profile conference on the long-term consequences of nuclear war was
held in Washington, chaired by Carl Sagan and Paul Ehrlich, the most
famous and media-savvy scientists of their generation. Sagan appeared on
the Johnny Carson show 40 times. Ehrlich was on 25 times. Following the
conference, there were press conferences, meetings with congressmen, and
so on. The formal papers in Science came months later.
This is not the way science is done, it is the way products are sold.
At the conference in Washington, during the question period, Ehrlich was
reminded that after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, scientists were quoted as
saying nothing would grow there for 75 years, but in fact melons were
growing the next year. So, he was asked, how accurate were these
findings now?
Ehrlich answered by saying "I think they are extremely robust.
Scientists may have made statements like that, although I cannot imagine
what their basis would have been, even with the state of science at that
time, but scientists are always making absurd statements, individually,
in various places. What we are doing here, however, is presenting a
consensus of a very large group of scientists."
What I have been suggesting to you is that nuclear winter was a
meaningless formula, tricked out with bad science, for policy ends. It
was political from the beginning, promoted in a well-orchestrated media
campaign that had to be planned weeks or months in advance.
Further evidence of the political nature of the whole project can be
found in the response to criticism. Although Richard Feynman was
characteristically blunt, saying, "I really don't think these guys know
what they're talking about," other prominent scientists were noticeably
reticent. Freeman Dyson was quoted as saying "It's an absolutely
atrocious piece of science but.who wants to be accused of being in favor
of nuclear war?" And Victor Weisskopf said, "The science is terrible
but---perhaps the psychology is good." The nuclear winter team followed
up the publication of such comments with letters to the editors denying
that these statements were ever made, though the scientists since then
have subsequently confirmed their views.
At the time, there was a concerted desire on the part of lots of people
to avoid nuclear war. If nuclear winter looked awful, why investigate
too closely? Who wanted to disagree? Only people like Edward Teller, the
"father of the H bomb."
Teller said, "While it is generally recognized that details are still
uncertain and deserve much more study, Dr. Sagan nevertheless has taken
the position that the whole scenario is so robust that there can be
little doubt about its main conclusions." Yet for most people, the fact
that nuclear winter was a scenario riddled with uncertainties did not
seem to be relevant.
I say it is hugely relevant. Once you abandon strict adherence to what
science tells us, once you start arranging the truth in a press
conference, then anything is possible. In one context, maybe you will
get some mobilization against nuclear war. But in another context, you
get Lysenkoism. In another, you get Nazi euthanasia. The danger is
always there, if you subvert science to political ends.
That is why it is so important for the future of science that the line
between what science can say with certainty, and what it cannot, be
drawn clearly-and defended.
What happened to Nuclear Winter? As the media glare faded, its robust
scenario appeared less persuasive; John Maddox, editor of Nature,
repeatedly criticized its claims; within a year, Stephen Schneider, one
of the leading figures in the climate model, began to speak of "nuclear
autumn." It just didn't have the same ring.
A final media embarrassment came in 1991, when Carl Sagan predicted on
Nightline that Kuwaiti oil fires would produce a nuclear winter effect,
causing a "year without a summer," and endangering crops around the
world. Sagan stressed this outcome was so likely that "it should affect
the war plans." None of it happened.
What, then, can we say were the lessons of Nuclear Winter? I believe the
lesson was that with a catchy name, a strong policy position and an
aggressive media campaign, nobody will dare to criticize the science,
and in short order, a terminally weak thesis will be established as
fact. After that, any criticism becomes beside the point. The war is
already over without a shot being fired. That was the lesson, and we had
a textbook application soon afterward, with second hand smoke.
DOES ALL THIS REMIND YOU OF THE CURRENT GLOBAL WARMING "DEBATE" CAPERS?
Regards
Bonzo
"...and I think future generations are not going to blame us for
anything except for being silly, for letting a few tenths of a degree
panic us"
Dr. Richard Lindzen, Professor of Meteorology MIT and Member of the
National Academy of Sciences
"What most commentators-and many scientists-seem to miss is that the
only thing we can say with certainly about climate is that it changes"
Dr. Richard Lindzen, Professor of Meteorology MIT and Member of the
National Academy of Sciences
[most of the current alarm over climate change is based on] "inherently
untrustworthy climate models, similar to those that cannot accurately
forecast the weather a week from now." Dr. Richard Lindzen, Professor of
Meteorology MIT and Member of the National Academy of Sciences
and his crazy predictions
EXTRACT FROM A MICHAEL CRICHTON SPEECH
In 1975, the National Academy of Sciences reported on "Long-Term
Worldwide Effects of Multiple Nuclear Weapons Detonations" but the
report estimated the effect of dust from nuclear blasts to be relatively
minor. In 1979, the Office of Technology Assessment issued a report on
"The Effects of Nuclear War" and stated that nuclear war could perhaps
produce irreversible adverse consequences on the environment. However,
because the scientific processes involved were poorly understood, the
report stated it was not possible to estimate the probable magnitude of
such damage.
Three years later, in 1982, the Swedish Academy of Sciences commissioned
a report entitled "The Atmosphere after a Nuclear War: Twilight at
Noon," which attempted to quantify the effect of smoke from burning
forests and cities. The authors speculated that there would be so much
smoke that a large cloud over the northern hemisphere would reduce
incoming sunlight below the level required for photosynthesis, and that
this would last for weeks or even longer.
The following year, five scientists including Richard Turco and Carl
Sagan published a paper in Science called "Nuclear Winter: Global
Consequences of Multiple Nuclear Explosions." This was the so-called
TTAPS report, which attempted to quantify more rigorously the
atmospheric effects, with the added credibility to be gained from an
actual computer model of climate.
At the heart of the TTAPS undertaking was another equation, never
specifically expressed, but one that could be paraphrased as follows:
Ds = Wn Ws Wh Tf Tb Pt Pr Pe. etc
(The amount of tropospheric dust=# warheads x size warheads x warhead
detonation height x flammability of targets x Target burn duration x
Particles entering the Troposphere x Particle reflectivity x Particle
endurance.and so on.)
The similarity to the Drake equation is striking. As with the Drake
equation, none of the variables can be determined. None at all. The
TTAPS study addressed this problem in part by mapping out different
wartime scenarios and assigning numbers to some of the variables, but
even so, the remaining variables were-and are-simply unknowable. Nobody
knows how much smoke will be generated when cities burn, creating
particles of what kind, and for how long. No one knows the effect of
local weather conditions on the amount of particles that will be
injected into the troposphere. No one knows how long the particles will
remain in the troposphere. And so on.
And remember, this is only four years after the OTA study concluded that
the underlying scientific processes were so poorly known that no
estimates could be reliably made. Nevertheless, the TTAPS study not only
made those estimates, but concluded they were catastrophic.
According to Sagan and his co-workers, even a limited 5,000 megaton
nuclear exchange would cause a global temperature drop of more than 35
degrees Centigrade, and this change would last for three months. The
greatest volcanic eruptions that we know of changed world temperatures
somewhere between .5 and 2 degrees Centigrade. Ice ages changed global
temperatures by 10 degrees. Here we have an estimated change three times
greater than any ice age. One might expect it to be the subject of some
dispute.
But Sagan and his co-workers were prepared, for nuclear winter was from
the outset the subject of a well-orchestrated media campaign. The first
announcement of nuclear winter appeared in an article by Sagan in the
Sunday supplement, Parade. The very next day, a highly-publicized,
high-profile conference on the long-term consequences of nuclear war was
held in Washington, chaired by Carl Sagan and Paul Ehrlich, the most
famous and media-savvy scientists of their generation. Sagan appeared on
the Johnny Carson show 40 times. Ehrlich was on 25 times. Following the
conference, there were press conferences, meetings with congressmen, and
so on. The formal papers in Science came months later.
This is not the way science is done, it is the way products are sold.
At the conference in Washington, during the question period, Ehrlich was
reminded that after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, scientists were quoted as
saying nothing would grow there for 75 years, but in fact melons were
growing the next year. So, he was asked, how accurate were these
findings now?
Ehrlich answered by saying "I think they are extremely robust.
Scientists may have made statements like that, although I cannot imagine
what their basis would have been, even with the state of science at that
time, but scientists are always making absurd statements, individually,
in various places. What we are doing here, however, is presenting a
consensus of a very large group of scientists."
What I have been suggesting to you is that nuclear winter was a
meaningless formula, tricked out with bad science, for policy ends. It
was political from the beginning, promoted in a well-orchestrated media
campaign that had to be planned weeks or months in advance.
Further evidence of the political nature of the whole project can be
found in the response to criticism. Although Richard Feynman was
characteristically blunt, saying, "I really don't think these guys know
what they're talking about," other prominent scientists were noticeably
reticent. Freeman Dyson was quoted as saying "It's an absolutely
atrocious piece of science but.who wants to be accused of being in favor
of nuclear war?" And Victor Weisskopf said, "The science is terrible
but---perhaps the psychology is good." The nuclear winter team followed
up the publication of such comments with letters to the editors denying
that these statements were ever made, though the scientists since then
have subsequently confirmed their views.
At the time, there was a concerted desire on the part of lots of people
to avoid nuclear war. If nuclear winter looked awful, why investigate
too closely? Who wanted to disagree? Only people like Edward Teller, the
"father of the H bomb."
Teller said, "While it is generally recognized that details are still
uncertain and deserve much more study, Dr. Sagan nevertheless has taken
the position that the whole scenario is so robust that there can be
little doubt about its main conclusions." Yet for most people, the fact
that nuclear winter was a scenario riddled with uncertainties did not
seem to be relevant.
I say it is hugely relevant. Once you abandon strict adherence to what
science tells us, once you start arranging the truth in a press
conference, then anything is possible. In one context, maybe you will
get some mobilization against nuclear war. But in another context, you
get Lysenkoism. In another, you get Nazi euthanasia. The danger is
always there, if you subvert science to political ends.
That is why it is so important for the future of science that the line
between what science can say with certainty, and what it cannot, be
drawn clearly-and defended.
What happened to Nuclear Winter? As the media glare faded, its robust
scenario appeared less persuasive; John Maddox, editor of Nature,
repeatedly criticized its claims; within a year, Stephen Schneider, one
of the leading figures in the climate model, began to speak of "nuclear
autumn." It just didn't have the same ring.
A final media embarrassment came in 1991, when Carl Sagan predicted on
Nightline that Kuwaiti oil fires would produce a nuclear winter effect,
causing a "year without a summer," and endangering crops around the
world. Sagan stressed this outcome was so likely that "it should affect
the war plans." None of it happened.
What, then, can we say were the lessons of Nuclear Winter? I believe the
lesson was that with a catchy name, a strong policy position and an
aggressive media campaign, nobody will dare to criticize the science,
and in short order, a terminally weak thesis will be established as
fact. After that, any criticism becomes beside the point. The war is
already over without a shot being fired. That was the lesson, and we had
a textbook application soon afterward, with second hand smoke.
DOES ALL THIS REMIND YOU OF THE CURRENT GLOBAL WARMING "DEBATE" CAPERS?
Regards
Bonzo
"...and I think future generations are not going to blame us for
anything except for being silly, for letting a few tenths of a degree
panic us"
Dr. Richard Lindzen, Professor of Meteorology MIT and Member of the
National Academy of Sciences
"What most commentators-and many scientists-seem to miss is that the
only thing we can say with certainly about climate is that it changes"
Dr. Richard Lindzen, Professor of Meteorology MIT and Member of the
National Academy of Sciences
[most of the current alarm over climate change is based on] "inherently
untrustworthy climate models, similar to those that cannot accurately
forecast the weather a week from now." Dr. Richard Lindzen, Professor of
Meteorology MIT and Member of the National Academy of Sciences